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ABSTRACT
We make several contributions that quantify the real-time
hash rate and therefore the consensus of a blockchain. We
show that by using only the hash value of blocks, we can
estimate and measure the hash rate of all miners or individual
miners, with quantifiable accuracy. We apply our techniques
to the Ethereum and Bitcoin blockchains; our solution applies
to any proof-of-work-based blockchain that relies on a numeric
target for the validation of blocks. We also show that if miners
regularly broadcast status reports of their partial proof-of-
work, the hash rate estimates are significantly more accurate
at a cost of slightly higher bandwidth. Whether using only
the blockchain, or the additional information in status reports,
merchants can use our techniques to quantify in real-time the
threat of double-spend attacks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchains, such as Bitcoin [27] and Ethereum [17], are
among the most successful peer-to-peer (p2p) systems on
the Internet. Bitcoin has been adopted more widely for e-
commerce than any previous digital currency. Ethereum is
also quickly gaining prominence as a blockchain that runs
Turing-complete distributed applications. Ethereum applica-
tions include sub-currencies [12], distributed autonomous
organizations with share holders [13], prediction markets [2],
and games [18]; and it currently has around half the market
capitalization of Bitcoin.
There are many advantages to blockchains, including de-
centralized operation. One of the primary limitations of
blockchains is that the status of transactions, blocks, and
branches is not immutable — a fork of blocks supported
by greater proof of work (POW) can emerge at any time.
Fortunately, the probability that there will be a change in
consensus regarding which fork to build on decreases expo-
nentially as the blockchain grows [27]. Specifically, consider
an attacker, with a fraction of all mining power 0 < q < 12 ,
that wishes to create a fork starting from a point z blocks
deep on themain chain. Let themining power building on the
main chain be p, such that q+p = 1. The probability [20] that
the attacker will eventually produce a fork with more POW
is (qp )
z . Several models of blockchain security are largely
based on the relative values of p, q, and z; see [19, 21].
For merchants who are vulnerable to attack, applying
these models to a blockchain at a particular moment in time
is not possible without assigning an accurate value to p or q.
This is a challenging task because miners do not publish their
hash rates in real-time in a format that is verifiable by third
parties. Because no such information is available, merchants
selling goods via Bitcoin and Ethereum have no guidance
for when transactions are sufficiently safe from attacks. For
example, the core Bitcoin client displays a transaction as con-
firmed once it is exactly 6 blocks deep in the blockchain [7],
an overly simplistic choice that is used regardless of any
other factors or conditions. Advice from the community is
appropriately vague on when a block is confirmed [8].
To further complicate this problem, miners’ hash rates
can and do change dynamically (e.g., due to diurnal electric-
ity rates), even though the POW algorithms are engineered
to change their work targets glacially. In other words, mer-
chants who seek a high probability that a transaction’s status
will not change should be concerned with not only block
depth, but the instantaneous hash rate of the network. Mean-
while, honest consumers can grow impatient waiting for a
large number of blocks to be appended to the blockchain in
order to get their merchandise, especially when traditional
bank-based commerce can take seconds.
Contributions. In this paper, wemake several contributions
based on novel approaches to estimating the real-time hash
rate of miners and, therefore, the real-time consensus of
a blockchain. We apply our techniques to both the actual
Ethereum and Bitcoin blockchains, and in fact, they can be
applied to any proof-of-work-based blockchain that relies
on a numeric target for the validation of blocks [26, 31]. Our
contributions are summarized as follows.
• First, we design a method of accurate hash rate estima-
tion based on compact status reports issued by miners.
The reports add no computational load to miners, and
are stored neither on the blockchain nor at peers that
receive them. They can be broadcast off-network, for
example via RSS or Twitter. Just like block headers, re-
ports are verifiable as authentic POW by third parties.
• Second, we show hash rates can be estimated from
only blocks that are published to the blockchain. This
approach requires no cooperation from the miners, but
is less accurate than status reports.
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• We evaluate the accuracy of the two approaches using
a synthetic blockchain as ground truth. Additionally,
we derive Chernoff bounds for the accuracy of our esti-
mates from status reports. We show that both methods
can be used together in support of incremental adop-
tion by mining pools. Our blockchain-only method in-
curs no network costs. Status reports incur extra traffic
depending on their rate. For example, if all active min-
ers issue about 10 reports per block, the cost is about
0.03 KBps for Bitcoin and 6.6 KBps for Ethereum; note
that none of the report data needs to be archived. The
accuracy of both methods is tunable.
• We apply our estimates to calculating the probability
of a double-spend attack against blocks as they garner
descendants. We show that using status reports, 99% of
blocks have a risk of 0.1% by depth of 13 for a worst-
case estimate. We show that without status reports,
merchants should wait much longer. We characterize
the historical performance of Ethereum and Bitcoin,
and show half of blocks require a depth of at least 40
before an attacker’s success is below 0.1% for a worst
case estimate. We also consider attacks against our ap-
proach. A public demo is at http://cs.umass.edu/~brian/
blockchain.html that provides a quantified, realtime
estimate of the security of blocks.
We begin with a background on blockchains and conclude
with a discussion of limitations and related work.
2 BACKGROUND
The blockchain concept was introduced by Nakamoto [27]
as a method of probabilistic distributed consensus [35]. Orig-
inally designed to be the backbone of the Bitcoin distributed
cryptographic currency, blockchains have since been applied
to a variety of scenarios. Bitcoin itself includes a scripting
language that supports a limited set of custom smart con-
tracts. Ethereum[17] is a blockchain-based distributed sys-
tem that supports Turing-complete software and includes
a global data store. Transactions in Ethereum represent the
transfer of money or data among programs, allowing for a
richer space of distributed applications. Other blockchains
have been proposed and implemented to support anonymous
transactions [31], hedge funds [13], medical records [3], and
alternate currencies [12, 26]. Below we describe the aspects
of Bitcoin and Ethereum that are relevant to us. Tschorsch
et al. [34], Bonneau et al. [9], and Croman et al. [11] offer
summaries of broader blockchain research issues.
2.1 Bitcoin
Accounts. Bitcoin users store bitcoins in accounts called
addresses, which are created with an empty balance simply
by generating a public/private key pair. The transfer of coin
between addresses, via transactions, is recorded on a public
ledger called a blockchain. Transactions are authenticated
via a private key signature, and the balance of each account
can be derived from the blockchain.
Adding to the blockchain. To be added to the blockchain,
transactions are broadcast by users on Bitcoin’s p2p network.
A set of miners on the p2p network verify that each trans-
action is signed correctly, does not conflict with a previous
transaction, does not move more coin than is contained in
the address, and other functions. Each miner independently
agglomerates a set of valid transactions into a candidate block
and attempts to solve a predefined cryptographic puzzle as
POW, which involves data from the candidate block and
a specific prior block. The new transactions are only valid
if they do not conflict with the set of transactions that are
contained in all blocks that are direct ancestors.
The first miner to solve the problem broadcasts his solu-
tion to the network, and by virtue of the solution, is able to
add the block to the ever-growing blockchain as a child of
the prior block. The miners then start over, using the newly
appended blockchain and the set of remaining transactions.
The miners’ incentive for discovering a new block is a reward
of coins, called the coinbase, consisting of a predetermined
block reward (currently worth 12.5 Bitcoins) and fees from
transactions included in the block.
In Bitcoin, the POWcomputation is dynamically calibrated
to take approximately ten minutes per block. When transac-
tions appear in a block, they are confirmed, and each subse-
quent block provides additional confirmation. To announce a
new block, a miner lists all transactions contained in the new
block along with a header that contains an easily-verifiable
POW solution. When a node or miner receives a new block,
he validates each transaction in the block and the POW.
Notably, if there is a fork on the chain, honest miners
always select the prior block as the last block containing the
largest amount of POW. However, due to propagation delays
in the network, miners can receive competing (but valid)
block announcements, which bifurcates the chain, until one
of the two forks is appended to first.
Block Headers. Any entity can elect to be a miner for Bit-
coin, and there is no centralized party from whom to seek
approval for mining. If all miners were to simply vote on
which block should be appended to the main chain, then the
mining process would fall vulnerable to a Sybil attack [14].
The POW puzzle addresses this problem by performing a
kind of decentralized leader election: the miner that solves
the puzzle can decide which block to append to the chain.
Proof-of-Work.Bitcoin uses a simple POWalgorithm based
on cryptographic hashing, proposed earlier by Douceur [14].
Specifically, miners apply a 256-bit cryptographic hash algo-
rithm [23] to an 80-byte block header, and the puzzle is solved
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if the resulting value is less than a known target, 0 < t < 2256.
The header in Bitcoin consists of the Merkle root of the set
of transactions, a timestamp, the target (stored as 2224/t ), a
nonce, and the hash of the prior block’s header. If the hash
is not less than the target, then a new nonce is selected to
generate a new hash (the Merkle root can be adjusted as
well). This process repeats until some miner finds a solution.
Each time a nonce is selected and the block header is
hashed, the miner is sampling a value from a discrete uni-
form distribution with range [0, 2256 − 1]. The probability of
solving the POW and discovering a block is the cumulative
probability of selecting a value from [0, t], which is t/2256.
Hence, in expectation, the number of samples needed to dis-
cover a block is 2256/t . Bitcoin adjusts the target so that on
average it takes about 600 seconds to find a block. Typically,
the target is described for convenience as a difficulty, defined
to be D = 2224/t . Bitcoin’s difficulty is set once every two
weeks.
2.2 Ethereum
Ethereum operates very similarly to Bitcoin. The following
differences are relevant to the context of this paper. Ethereum
miners solve a POW problem that is more complicated than
Bitcoin in an attempt to disadvantage miners with custom
ASICs. However, in the end, a miner still compares a hash
value to the target. Specifically, the number of values in the
block header is larger, resulting in a 508-byte header. It’s not
the hash of the header that is compared against the target,
but the hash resulting from an Ethereum-specific algorithm
called ETHASH [16], for which the hash of the block header
is the primary input. In the end, the POW hash value is
a sample from a discrete uniform distribution with range
[0, 2256 − 1], and the probability of block discovery is t/2256.
Amajor difference of Ethereum is that the target is set such
that the expected time between blocks is 15 seconds. This
setting results in quicker confirmation times, but as a result,
the probability that two miners announce blocks within the
propagation time of a block announcement is much higher.
Therefore, there are many abandoned forks in the chain.
Ethereum uses a modified version of the GHOST [32] proto-
col for selecting the main fork of the blockchain: the main
chain follows the block at each level with the most POW on
its subtree. These differences do not affect the application of
our algorithms; in fact, the presence of ommers is additional
data which improves our estimates.
2.3 Double-spend Attacks
The fundamental blockchain double-spend attack [27] oper-
ates as follows. An attacker offers a transaction to a merchant
in exchange for goods. The transaction appears on the block-
chain in block B1, with block B0 denoting the prior block.
The merchant releases goods purchased by the transaction
to the attacker only after blocks B2, . . . ,Bz follow. Honest
miners, with power 0 < p < 1 add these z − 1 new blocks.
The attacker, with mining power q = 1 − p races to add
a distinct sequence of blocks of length at least z + 1 that
forks from B0. Nakamoto derived the probability of the at-
tacker’s success of creating a longer fork, given infinite time.
Nakamoto assumes that the miner’s power is constant and
that she never gives up on the attack. The attacker succeeds
by producing any chain of length z + 1 or longer, but cannot
announce the chain before the honest miners produce Bz
since the merchant will not release purchased goods until
then. This probability, where λ = zqp , is
D(q, z) =

1 −
z∑
k=0
λk e−λ
k !
(
1 − (qp )z−k
)
, if q < 12
1 , if q ≥ 12
(1)
When z = 6, an attacker with q < 0.127 has a less than
0.001 probability of success. Based on that value, the core
bitcoind client displays transactions as confirmed once they
appear in a block that is 6 deep in the chain.
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
We seek to quantify the hash rate of miners in real-time,
thereby quantifying the consensus of a blockchain towards
its blocks and the transactions they hold. Our goal is to
increase transparency so that merchants can judge their
vulnerability to a double-spend attack; in short, we wish to
answer the question, what is the risk of releasing goods to
a consumer for a transaction that is z block deep given the
current hash rate of the network?
Specifically, in Section 4, we propose that miners periodi-
cally issue status reports that are block headers with partial
POW. Each report is exactly a block header except the nonce
corresponds to the smallest hash value the miner found dur-
ing the last σ seconds. We then answer these questions:
1. Given a set of status reports produced by a miner
during a window of time, how many hashes (sam-
ples) were taken to produce the reports?
We also quantify the network bandwidth costs for applying
status reports to Bitcoin and Ethereum.
In Section 5, we ask how we can accomplish the task of
estimating hash rate without status reports.
2. Given the set of valid blocks that were added to the
blockchain during a window of time, how many hashes
(samples) were taken by all miners to produce the blocks?
We also ask how this approach can be combined with sta-
tus reports for incremental deployment. In Section 6, we
characterize the accuracy of our two estimators.
In Section 7, we apply our estimators to decide when to
consider a transaction secure from double-spend attacks. Let
block B1 contain a transaction of interest, and let block B0
3
Variable Description
hˆ estimation of network hash rate
hˆm estimation of an individual miner’s hash rate
σ duration of time spent mining during interval
I
θm number of hashes performed per miner per
status report
θσ number of network-wide hashes performed
during time duration σ
θ number of hashes performed, i.e. shorthand
for θm or θσ
S the size of the hash space, i.e. S = 2256 − 1
V for an arbitrary miner, a random variable rep-
resenting the first order statistic (minimum
hash value) after hashing θ times, where
Vi ∼ Expon(β)
β exponential survival parameter of Vi
V = V1, . . . ,Vn random sample of n first order statistics
V the observed sample mean of V
βˆ estimation of β , using status reports
θˆ estimated θ from the sample population
Y random variable equal to 0 if no block is pro-
duced during interval I ; else the hash of the
block. Note that Yi is a function of Vi .
Y = Y1, . . . ,Yn random sample of n consecutive intervals,
where a block is observed or not
Y the observed sample mean of Y
E[Y]β the expected value of Y parameterized by β
β˜ estimation of β , using only the blockchain
Figure 1: List of variables presented in Section 4 and 5.
be its parent. Let Bi be the ith descendant from B0 via B1.
We then estimate the hash rate of the network in a window
prior to B0, and the hash rate of the network in a window
from B0 to Bi , and we ask:
3. Assuming the difference in hash rate is being applied
to a double-spend attack of the transaction based on a
fork from B0, what is the probability the attacker will
succeed?
We apply our algorithm to the real Bitcoin and Ethereum
blockchains to characterize the typical delay required to
ensure that the risk of a double-spend is suitably low.
4 STATUS REPORTS
In this section, we propose that active mining pools issue
status reports periodically, which allow third parties to esti-
mate their hash rate and to learn which specific block they
are building on top of. Each report is exactly a block header
except that the POW does not satisfy the current target. In-
stead, the minimum hash value in the report represents the
hash found since the last block broadcast on the chain or
their last report. To be clear, each status report does not di-
rectly report the minimum hash value; instead, reports are
of the input values to the POW algorithm.
Below, we present and evaluate the accuracy of a method
for estimating the hash rate of each miner using status re-
ports. In the next section, we present a technique to make
estimates from only blocks on the blockchain.
4.1 Hash Rate Estimation
As described in Section 2, the result of Bitcoin’s and Ether-
eum’s POW algorithms is a sample taken randomly from a
discrete uniform distribution that ranges between [0, 2b − 1],
where b = 256. The winning miner is the one that first pro-
duces a hash smaller than the target.
If a miner m periodically announces the smallest value
he has discovered, we can estimate the hash rate, hˆm , he is
lending toward finding a successor to a given block. In the
next section, we detail how to accurately estimate the hash
rate of cooperative miners using status reports.
Continuous model. In order to estimate a miner’s hash
rate, first we present a continuous model to describe the
distribution of the smallest hash value he reports. Let I be an
interval of σ seconds during which a miner attempts to mine
a block. During that interval, the miner hashes the block θm
times generating a sequence of hash values Z = Z1, . . . ,Zθm .
Although we know σ , we do not know θm a priori. At the end
of the interval, the miner sends status reportV = Z(1), which
denotes the lowest hash value achieved on the block during
I . In other words, V is the random variable representing the
first order statistic after hashing the block θm times. Our goal
is to determine θm from a sample of first order statistics.
Let S = 2256 − 1 be the size of the hash space. The proba-
bility that any V is greater than some v ∈ [0, S] is equal to
1 −v/S . Thus, the probability that V is always greater than
v across θm independent trials computed during I is given
by (1 −v/S)θm . Now define FV (v | S) to be the CDF of V . It
follows that
FV (v | S) = 1 −
(
1 − v
S
)θm
. (2)
Parameter θm can be expressed as a function of S :
θm = S/β . (3)
Consider how FV (v | S) changes as S increases. A common
limit shows that
lim
S→∞
FV (v | S) = 1 − e
−v
β . (4)
Thus, V ∼ Expon(β), where β is the exponential survival
parameter. Since the mean of the exponential distribution is
equal to the survival parameter, we can see that the expected
value of V is β = S/θm . We next show how status reports
spanning multiple intervals can be used to derive a robust
estimator of θm , and ultimately hˆm .
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Figure 2: A CDF of the percentage of the estimated hash
rate to the real hash rate, as the number of status reports
increase. 100% on the x-axis denotes the line along which
the estimated hash rate and real hash rate are equivalent.
Estimator for hash rate. Let V = V1, . . . ,Vn with Vi ∼
Expon(β) be a random sample representing n status reports,
each sent σ seconds apart by a miner. Because each Vi is
Expon(β) and i.i.d., the maximum likelihood estimator of β is
equal to the sample mean, V . Furthermore, the sample mean
is an unbiased estimator of the population mean; so V is an
unbiased estimator of β .
Since β = S/θm , it follows then that a reasonable estimator
for θm is given by
θˆm =
S
V
. (5)
Finally, the miner’s hash rate hˆm can be estimated as
hˆm =
θˆm
σ
=
S
Vσ
. (6)
Empirical evaluation of accuracy.We implemented and
evaluated this technique against a simulated miner. The
miner sampled from a discrete uniform distribution at a fixed
rate of h and issued status reports regularly. Our simulated
recipient estimated the hash rate, hˆ, using Equation 6 given
40, 240, 480, or 720 reports. We measure the accuracy as hˆ/h
and show the result of tens of thousands of trials in Figure 2
as a CDF of the accuracy. A perfect estimate is at 100%. As
the number of status reports increases, a greater fraction
of our estimates are aligned with the real hash rate. More
reports are required for high accuracy; however, when we
apply this technique to a blockchain, we are interested in
a window of blocks rather than a single block. Hence, the
count of available status reports adds up quickly.
5 BLOCKCHAIN-ONLY ESTIMATION
In this section, we describe a blockchain-only method of
estimating miner hash rates. For this estimator, we treat the
entire network as a single miner and a block as a status re-
port that can only be observed at certain intervals. Although
this approach has no additional network costs and does not
require cooperation from miners, it is less accurate than sta-
tus reports. We then extend the technique to allow for hash
rate estimation of an individual or a subset of miners. As we
show, this extension allows for the incremental deployment
of status reports.
5.1 Network Hash Rate Estimation
We would like to estimate the network hash rate, hˆ, using
only the observed POW hash values that are represented by
mined blocks. A critical step in this process is estimating
the number of hashes that were performed network-wide
using these observed values. Conceptually, we are treating
the entire network as a single miner from whom we receive
reports only when a block is mined.
Consider a window of time during which at least one block
is announced. We segment time into σ -second intervals: I =
I1, . . . , In , and letV = V1, . . . ,Vn be the minimum hash value
achieved across the entire network for each interval. Note
that a valid Vi is produced during every interval Ii , even
though it is not broadcast to the network unless it is below
the target. This notation is consistent with our definitions
from Section 4.1.
Suppose that blocks were mined at the end of intervals
IB ⊆ I so that the observed hash values are given by the
set O = {Vi | Ii ∈ IB }. In practice, a block could have been
mined at any point during an interval in IB , but the dis-
tinction becomes less important as σ → 0. Finally, assume
that, network-wide, θσ hashes were performed during each
interval. Our goal is to determine an estimator of θσ .
Estimator for β , the expected minimum POWhash. In
Section 4.1, we showed that Vi ∼ Expon(β) as S → ∞ and
argued that V is a good estimator of β . But that approach
does not work here since we are missing most of the values
Vi . Consider instead a new sequence of random variables
Y = Y1, . . . ,Yn defined as a function of V:
Yi = 1Vi ≤t (Vi )Vi =
{
Vi , Vi ≤ t
0, otherwise , (7)
where t is the target and 1C (x) is the indicator function equal
to 1 when x ∈ C and 0 otherwise. Since each Yi is a function
of Vi and Vi ∼ Expon(β), it is straightforward to derive the
expected value of any given Yi :
E[Yi ]β = 1
β
∫ t
0
ve−v/βdv (8)
= β − βe−t/β
(
t
β
+ 1
)
(9)
The sample mean Y is simpler to determine. It is the sum
of the observed hash values Oi divided by the number of
intervals:
Y =
∑
i Oi
|I | . (10)
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Thus, we can derive the method of moments (MoM) [10]
estimator β˜ by equating E[Yi ]β and Y :
β˜ − β˜e−t/β˜
(
t
β˜
+ 1
)
= Y . (11)
Unfortunately, it is difficult to solve Equation 11 for β˜
analytically. Moreover, the implicitly defined β˜ is not actually
a function because E[Yi ]β˜ not a one-to-one function of β˜ . And
so we note that
∂2E[Yi ]β˜
∂β˜2
=
t2
b4
e−t/β˜ (β˜ − t) (12)
with roots at t = 0 and t = β˜ . Because we assume that
the target t is always positive, this means that E[Yi ]β˜ has
a single inflection point at t = β˜ . In light of the fact that
E[Yi ]β˜ is monotonic for values of β˜ on either side of t , it is
also possible to verify that E[Yi ]β˜ is strictly increasing for
β˜ < t and decreasing for β˜ > t . Thus, Equation 11 implicitly
defines two different functions for β˜ : β˜(Y )− when β˜ < t and
β˜(Y )+ when β˜ > t .
Because both sides of the function β˜(Y ) are monotonic, it
is straightforward to solve each using binary search. Algo-
rithm 1 defines a procedure for finding β˜(Y )+, and β˜(Y )− can
be found in a similar fashion.
A drawback of the estimator is that it forces the practi-
tioner to guess if β˜ is greater or less than t in order to find
its actual value. We find that in practice this is rarely an
issue. Recall that β is the expected minimum hash value for
a σ -second time interval, while t is the target minimum hash
for the much longer block creation interval. Thus, unless the
mining pool under consideration is mining at many times
the current difficulty, we can be quite certain that β ≫ t .
Accordingly, it is also likely that β˜ will also be significantly
larger than t , which makes β˜(Y )+ the correct branch to use.
Estimating hash rate from β˜ . Because β = S/θσ , a good
estimator for θσ is θˆσ = S/β˜ . This estimates the number of
hashes per σ -second interval, which we can use to estimate
the hash rate of the entire block creation interval as
hˆ =
S
β˜σ
. (13)
Empirical evaluation of accuracy.We used the technique
described above to estimate the number of network-wide
hashes on a synthetic blockchain, using a window of 100, 500,
1000, or 5000 seconds, as shown in Figure 3. As the window
length increases, we incorporate data from additional blocks,
allowing for a greater portion of estimates to be equal to the
the real hash rate.
We also used our technique to estimate the number of
hashes per block at regular intervals in the Bitcoin and Ether-
eum networks. As a comparison with a naive approach, we
Algorithm 1 Find β˜
1: Let τ > 0 be some small tolerance parameter
2: Set L = 0, H = S , and choose θσ = S/2
3: Set β˜ = S/θσ
4: Calculate E[Y ]β by substituting beta tilde as beta into
Equation 9
5: if E[Y ]β˜ − τ > Y then
6: Set L = θσ , H = H , and θσ = L + (H − L)/2
7: Goto 3
8: else if E[Y ]β˜ + τ < Y then
9: Set L = L, H = θσ , and θσ = L + (H − L)/2
10: Goto 3
11: else
12: return β˜
13: end if
synthetic
0% 50% 100% 150%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
h^ h
CD
F
100 min. (~11 blocks)
500 min. (~51 blocks)
1000 min. (~101 blocks)
2000 min. (~201 blocks)
Figure 3: A CDF of network hash rate using method of mo-
ments on a synthetic blockchain.
calculated the expected number of hashes based on the diffi-
culty, D, of blocks and the current target, t . For Bitcoin, this
value is E[hˆ] = 2256t ·600 = 2
32D
600 ; it is E[hˆ] = 232D/15 for Ether-
eum. The accuracy of our approach is apparent in Figures 4
and 5.
5.2 Hash Rate Estimation of a Subset of
Miners
We can estimate the hash rate of a single miner or a subset
of miners with a simple extension of our technique from
Section 5.1. Specifically, for a given minerm, we vary Eq. 5
such that the random variable Y = Y1, . . . ,Yn is defined as a
function of V as follows:
Yi = 1Vi ≤t (Vi )Vi =
{
Vi Vi ≤ t and 1m(Vi )
0 otherwise (14)
where 1m(x) is the indicator function equal to 1 when x is
mined bym and 0 otherwise. Therefore, we construct Y only
using the blocks issued by a given miner. The same approach
also works for a subset of all miners.
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Figure 4: Network-wide hash rate, computed usingMoM, of
the Bitcoin network compared to the hash rate calculated
based on network difficulty and target value. Points repre-
sent a window of 500 minutes (about 50 blocks); for clarity,
only a sample of all possible windows is plotted.
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Figure 5: Network-wide hash rate, computed usingMoM, of
the Ethereumnetwork compared to the hash rate calculated
based on network difficulty and target value. Points repre-
sent a window of 12.5 minutes (about 50 blocks); for clarity,
only a sample of all possible windows is plotted.
Additionally, the sample mean, Y , must also be adjusted
such that it is the sum of the observed hash values issued by
the given miner divided by the number of intervals. Thus,
once Y and Y only account for the blocks mined by a given
miner, Eq. 11 and Alg. 1 are applicable.
Incremental Deployment. If no miners adopt status re-
ports, network-wide hash rate can be calculated using the
technique detailed in Section 5.1. For those miners who de-
ploy status reports, the estimator in Section 4.1 can be used,
while for those remaining, the MoM estimator via Eq. 14
provides a solution; the two values are then summed.
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Figure 6: Mean error of network hash rate estimation as the
number ofminers issuing status reports increases. Synthetic
blockchain with block discovery set to every 600 seconds.
An 8-blockwindow forMoM; status reports are issued about
320 times during the 8-block window. The accuracy of the
network estimate increases dramatically as status reports
are incrementally deployed. (Error bars are 95% c.i. of the
mean over 8,800 trials for each point.)
We evaluated this approach using a synthetic block chain
and 10 simulated miners, each with a fixed hash rate. Blocks
were targeted for discovery every 600 simulated seconds.
For hundreds of trials, we estimated the hash rate of the
network using only blocks. In subsequent trials, we allowed
an increasing number of miners to issue status reports ev-
ery 15 seconds. For the remaining miners that did not issue
reports, we used Eq. 14 to compute the number of hashes
they performed, i.e., we used only the blocks issued by those
miners not producing status reports. We then summed our
estimates to calculate network-wide hash rate.
Figure 6 shows results of this experiment for a window of
5000 seconds (about 8 blocks, and about 320 status reports).
Since 5000 seconds is a relatively small window for the MoM
estimator (see Figure 3), the accuracy is initially low at 35%.
The error in estimating the hash rate decreases rapidly as
miners adopt the status report mechanism.
6 TAIL BOUNDS
As the CDFs plotted in Figures 2 and 3 show, our estimators
have a distribution that is wide when there are too few re-
ports or blocks, respectively, to work with. In this section,
we characterize these tails. We provide Chernoff bounds
for our status-reports-based method and employ empirical
bootstrapping for our blockchain-only method.
These tail bounds provide a defense for thwarting the ef-
forts of attackers who seek to push falsified results to the
estimators. First, we describe the tail bounds, and then dis-
cuss their use against attackers.
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In Section 7, we use these bounds to both characterize the
variance of our estimator in practice, and as a method to
thwart certain attacks.
6.1 Chernoff Bound for Status Reports
In Appendix A, we derive the upper and lower tail Chernoff
bound on our estimate of β . The upper bound is the following
P
(
β − βˆ
βˆ
≥ π
)
≤ exp
[ nπ
1 + π − n ln(1 + π )
]
, (15)
where n is the number of status reports in a window and
π represents the relative deviation of βˆ from β . This result
gives us a natural interpretation of the Chernoff bound, and a
method to set it. In order to conservatively estimate a miner’s
mining power, it must be the case that βˆ , estimated by V , in
Equation 6, is large. A smaller βˆ implies that we are more
likely to overestimate a miner’s mining power. Therefore,
we want the fractional change from βˆ to β (described by
(β − βˆ)/βˆ) to be bounded. When this fractional change is
larger, our estimate for a miner’s mining power is higher.
A merchant would use the bound as follows. First, from
n status reports issued by a miner, she computes θˆm using
Eq. 5, and then sets βˆm = S/θˆm . Given n, she finds the value
of π such that the RHS of Eq.6 is less than or equal to a
threshold (e.g., 0.05). She then assumes βmL = βˆm/(π + 1) as
a lower bound with high probability. We now have an upper
bound on the number of hashes performed by the miner as
θmH = S/βmL .
In Section 7, we also make use of the lower bound with a
similar formula, also derived in the Appendix:
P
(
βˆ − β
β
≥ π
)
≤ 11 + π exp [−n(π − ln(1 + π ))] . (16)
In this case, given n reports, the merchant solves for an
appropriate π that meets her threshold, and then sets βmH =
βˆm(π + 1) and θmL = S/βmH .
6.2 Empirical Bounds for MoM
We found that tail bounds for Eq. 11 are not easily derived
using standard techniques, such as Chernoff or Chebychev.
We therefore calculate an empirical bound based on the well-
known bootstrap [10, 15] technique.
Specifically, given a window of intervals containing a se-
quence of n blocks O = O1, . . . ,On , we create 10,000 new
samples, each created by selecting n blocks with replacement
from O. For each new sample, we compute its sample mean
Y . We then select the 5th percentile of this distribution as Y L
and solve for β˜L using Eq. 11. Finally, we have θH = S/β˜L .
Similarly, from the 95th percentile, we compute YH and β˜H ,
as well as θL = S/β˜H . The approach is limited in accuracy
for windows containing only a handful of blocks.
7 IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we apply our mining estimates to the prob-
lem of quantifying the threat posed by double-spend attacks.
Specifically, we answer the question, at what block depth can
a merchant safely release goods to a consumer given current
estimates of hash rates on the main chain? We make use of
historical data from the Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchains
to characterize this value in practice. We also generated syn-
thetic blockchain data so that we can evaluate the accuracy
of our approach against known miner power.
7.1 Quantifying the Probability of a
Double-spend Attack
In Section 2.3, we describe the double-spend attack against
a transaction that appears in block B1, which is a child of
block B0. Using the techniques from previous sections, we
can quantify the amount of mining power devoted to mining
on block B1 and its descendants. Specifically, an estimate
of all miners working on B1 and descendants is available
from Eq. 13 using the blockchain-only MoM estimator; or
the same estimate can be more accurately calculated as the
sum of individual miners’ powers from status reports, using
Eq. 6.
Let θ0 be the network-wide hash rate in the case of MoM,
or the sum of hash rates for all miners in the case of status
reports, estimated from a pre-window ofw blocks ending with
B0. Let θi be the hash rate calculated from a post-window of
blocks starting with B0 until Bi , where i is the latest block on
the chain descendent from B1. The merchant assumes that
the amount of attacker mining power working against B1
and its descendants is the complement of the proportion of
mining power in the post-window to the pre-window:
qi = 1 − θi
θ0
. (17)
Of course, past performance is no prediction of what miners
will do in the future: perhaps even after 1,000 blocks, the
attacker will attempt to double-spend. To account for this
possibility, we assume that from the honest miner’s block i+1
onward, the attacker’s mining power will be fixed at 12.7%
(see Section 2.3). That is, we use a revision of Nakamoto’s
formula:
D(qi , z) =

1 −
z∑
k=0
λk e−λ
k !
(
1 − ( q∗1−q∗ )z−k
)
, if qi < 12
1 , if qi ≥ 12
(18)
where λ = zqi1−qi and q∗ = 0.127. If the resulting probability
is below the merchant’s threshold (e.g., 0.1%), the goods are
released to the consumer. For each block added to the chain,
the merchant re-evaluates.
Bounding risk. A more conservative merchant, with per-
haps more coin at risk, will account for error in the estimates.
8
llll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll lllllllllllll ll lllllllllll llllllll lll lllll llllllll llll
lll
l
l
lll
ll
ll
ll
l llll
l
l
l
ll
lll
lll
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
ll
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
ll
l l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
2017−05−29 13:56:37
Bitcoin
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
1e−16
1e−14
1e−12
1e−10
1e−08
1e−06
1e−04
1e−02
1e+00
minutes elapsed
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 d
ou
bl
es
pe
nd
 
w
ith
 re
m
ai
ni
ng
 p
ow
e
r
l
l
l
lower bound
mean
upper bound
ll l ll
ll ll
l
lllll l
lllllll
lllll
lll
ll
l
l
l
l
lll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
ll llllll
l l
lllll ll
l
l lll
l
ll l
l
ll
l
ll ll lllll lllllllllllllll lllllllllllll
ll
llllll
ll
ll
lll
l
l
l
l
ll
lll
ll
lll
lll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
ll
l
ll
l
l
l l l
l
l ll
l l
l
2017−06−01 06:25:08
Ethereum
0 5 10 15 20 25
1e−16
1e−14
1e−12
1e−10
1e−08
1e−06
1e−04
1e−02
1e+00
minutes elapsed
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 d
ou
bl
es
pe
nd
 
w
ith
 re
m
ai
ni
ng
 p
ow
e
r
l
l
l
lower bound
mean
upper bound
Figure 7: Results of applying Eq. 18 to an example block as
its depth increases. The upper and lower bounds are calcu-
lated using bootstrapped estimates of the sample’s 5th and
95th percentile, respectively (Eq. 19 and 20).
For status reports, the merchant can make use of Chernoff
bounds from Section 6.1; and for the MoM estimator, the
merchant can use bootstrapped estimates of the sample’s tail
percentile from Section 6.2. The same approach can be used
to account for attackers, as we detail below in Section 7.5.
To consider the worst-case scenario, we use an upper-
bound estimate during the pre-window, and a lower-bound
estimate during the post-window.
qiL = 1 − θiL
θ0H
. (19)
The consequence is that goods are released later.
A best-case scenario for an impatient merchant seeking
the earliest time to release his goods is:
qiH = 1 − θiH
θ0L
. (20)
In other words, the two bounds characterize the error of
estimating attacker mining power using qi (Eq. 17). Both
bounds can be applied to Eq. 18.
Implementation.We implemented our techniques for Bit-
coin and Ethereum, using only information available on
the blockchain. We released a public demo for Bitcoin at
http://cs.umass.edu/~brian/blockchain.html. Once mining
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Figure 8: CDF for the depth required to defeat attackerswith
a given probability for synthetic data. The Chernoff bounds
are weaker than the empirical bootstrapping method used
for real blockchain data, but still demonstrate better results
in the worst case.
pools begin to release status reports, we will update to in-
crease the accuracy of our estimates, as discussed in Sec-
tion 5.2. The site is meant to show that we do not require
updates to the existent protocols or underlying topology.
(We will release source code at camera ready.)
Example output. Figure 7 is example of our technique ap-
plied to a single block as it ages. The figure shows the proba-
bility of attacker success (green line computed using Eq. 18)
given block depth in terms of minutes, computed using a
pre-window of 100 blocks. We also calculated the upper and
lower bounds on success; the red and blue lines show Eqs. 19
and 20, respectively. To highlight a difference between Bit-
coin and Ethereum, the figure is in minutes, instead of the
number of blocks in the post window. Below, we examine
the historical performance of the two networks.
7.2 Performance of Status Reports on
Synthetic Data
We implemented our techniques for status reports on a syn-
thetic blockchain to quantify its performance. The block-
chain was parameterized to issue blocks about once every
600 simulated seconds. All miners issued status reports at
rate of either 1, 5, or 10 times per block.
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Figure 9: CDF for the depth required to defeat attackerswith
a given probability. Because Ethereum includes ommers to
the blockchain, we are able to provide a tighter estimate.
We then sampled several hundred blocks from the chain
and computed Eqs. 18, 19, and 20 using estimates from status
reports and Chernoff bounds for each sample block as its
depth increased. We used pre-windows of 100 blocks. We
logged when each equation reached a set a threshold of 0.1%
probability of attacker success. Figure 8 shows these results
as a CDF for each equation.
The results show that when each mining pool issues on
average 1 report between block announcements, at most 6
blocks are required 90% of the time to reach the 0.1% attack
success threshold. This translates to one report every 15
seconds by each Ethereum mining pool, or one report every
ten minutes for each Bitcoin mining pool. However, at this
rate, the upper bound can be high. By increasing reports to
about 10 per block per miner (about 2 every 3 seconds in
Ethereum, and one every minute in Bitcoin), even the upper
bound shows that 99% of blocks are within a depth of 13.
7.3 Historical Bitcoin and Ethereum
Performance
We then performed the same analysis for historical data from
Bitcoin and Ethereum. We computed values for Eqs. 18, 19,
and 20 for over 2000 randomly selected blocks, each with a
100-block pre-window. For each block, we determined the
depth required such that the probability of attacker success
was less than 0.1%.
Figure 9 shows the CDF of these experiments for the two
networks. First, the results are much poorer than the status
report method. Second, it is notable that the two systems
exhibit similar mean performance. For both systems, to en-
sure the probability of attacker success is lower than 0.1%, at
least 10 blocks are required about 40% of the time; the upper
bounds are much weaker, requiring at least 40 blocks 50% of
the time. These values vary, but a strength of our technique
is that it is calculated by merchants for specific blocks.
Ethereum’s 15-second inter-block time results in a greater
number of abandoned blocks and forks (called ommers); these
are recorded to the blockchain as part the GHOST algorithm.
Our algorithm makes use of the ommers as part of its esti-
mate, and thus the bounds are tighter since there is more
information in each window. While Figure 7 demonstrates
that Ethereum more quickly reduces the risk of a double-
spend attack in terms of wall clock time, Figure 9 shows that
in terms of block depth, the two networks offer equivalent
security because they implement the same algorithm.
The dashed vertical line represents bitcoind’s choice of
6 blocks for declaring blocks as confirmed. According to
the mean estimate, this choice is too early about 70% of the
time in both networks. While there is error in the MoM
technique, the experiment demonstrates that the 6-block
choice is conservatively too early at least 30% of the time
for Ethereum, according to our upper-bound estimate from
Eq. 19. Because there are few forks in the Bitcoin blockchain,
there is less data for making estimates, and we cannot make
the same conservative claim for Bitcoin but expect it holds
true.
7.4 Bandwidth Costs
Using only information available from the blockchain to
estimate mining power requires no additional bandwidth.
The bandwidth required by status reports depends on the
number and rate at which they are issued. The size of a sta-
tus report is equal to the block header, plus a mining pool
identifier and cryptographic signature. Status reports would
be 80 bytes, the same size as block headers for Bitcoin; sim-
ilarly, they would be 508 bytes for Ethereum. We assume
that identifiers and signatures can be amortized by an SSL
connection to a web site. Each report also can be easily en-
coded as 1–2 tweets on Twitter, which provides validated
accounts and a secure global infrastructure for distributing
short announcements. (It is unclear if this approach would
violate Twitter’s terms of service.) Secured RSS/json feeds
from websites could also be used. In the case that two pools
claim the same block, the claims can easily be resolved by the
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real owner’s signing of the claim with the block’s coinbase
private key. Note that bandwidth costs are independent of
block size since they depend on only the block header.
To make a comparison of costs fair, we consider the fre-
quency of status reports in terms of the network’s block
interval: e.g., 10 per 600 seconds in Bitcoin, and 10 per 15
seconds in Ethereum. We assume that 20 mining pools are ac-
tive on each network, which mirrors current conditions. For
Bitcoin, if ten 80-byte status reports are sent per miner per
600 seconds, then the total cost for recipients is 0.026 KBps.
This additional traffic is small compared to keeping track of
the blockchain itself, which is about 1 MB/600 sec = 1.7KBps.
For Ethereum, if ten 508-byte status reports are sent per
miner per 15 seconds, then the total cost for recipients is
6.6 KBps. This additional traffic is much higher than keeping
track of the blockchain itself, which is about 10KB / 15sec =
0.6 KBps. In absolute terms, this is still low — for example,
streaming a song from Spotify at the lowest quality setting is
about 12 KBps. Further, Ethereum performancewould benefit
significantly from just 1 report per miner per 15 seconds (i.e.,
costing 0.66 KBps).
7.5 Attacks on Hash Rate Estimates
Malicious miners may try to issue status reports that cause
our hash rate estimates to be falsely higher or lower. In
particular, a minermaywant his mining rate to appear higher
during the post-window, or lower during the pre-window.
Attacker Model.We assume our attacker has a total hash
rate that is applied to the main chain in full during the pre-
window, and then partially during the post-window. Outside
of this restriction, attackers are challenging to model. For ex-
ample, an attacker may take advantage in a change between
the pre- and post-window in exchange rate of coin to a fiat
currency that is used to pay electricity. Or an attacker may
similarly take advantage of spot instances that fall in price
on a cloud service, such as EC2. We do not take into account
such economics or externalities. We discuss this limitation
further in Section 8.
It is easy for an attacker to falsely lower their pre-window
mining rate by simply not mining. Such an attacker is outside
our model — but to put it another way, we assume the pre-
window duration is sufficiently long to dissuade attackers
from giving up income from not mining.
Attack analyses. An attacker might attempt to pre-mine
the nonce values. However, the reports, just like blocks, are
tied to a particular prior block, preventing the miner from
creating status reports before a block is mined.
Similarly, an attacker might attempt to pre-mine within
the window of a single block. For example, they may report
the second order statistic as the second report. To prevent
this attack, we can require status reports to include a nonce
based on the previous status report. For example, if the report
header contains a nonce ni , then the nonce used for POW is
the hashed concatenation: n′i = H (n′i−1 |ni ), where n0 is the
hash of the prior block and H (·) is a hash function.
A more advanced strategy is for an attacker to wait until
she gets lucky. She mines until her status reports produce an
overestimate, and then diverts resources to a double-spend
attack. Or, the attacker stops mining towards a status report
at each interval when finding a minimum hash that satisfies
the target mean; for the remainder of the interval, an attacker
uses her mining power to execute a double-spend attack.
For these more advanced strategies, the attacker is taking
advantage of the tail of the estimator’s distribution. Chernoff
bounds are a powerful technique against such attacks. Yet,
we do not claim that Chernoff bounds defend against all
possible attacks. Consider an attacker with mining power x
that devotes 2x/3 to mining honestly, and x/3 to the double-
spend attack. If the miner never reveals their x/3 power
until the attack succeeds, our techniques would certainly fail
to detect this attacker. We have not analyzed whether this
attack is economically profitable.
In the case of status reports, an attacker can lower the mer-
chant’s estimate of their mining power by skipping status
reports or sending a hash that is not their lowest. We hypoth-
esize that this attack would be detectable because the rate
estimated by the status reports and that from the blocks they
add to the chain (see Section 5.2) would not be statistically
equal. We do not expect this comparison to work for short
windows of time, but neither have we determined the time
necessary for any differences to be statistically significant.
In the case of blockchain-only MoM estimations, the boot-
strap sample distribution provides protection similar to the
Chernoff bounds as the tails are difficult for an attacker to
avoid. Notably, attackers of the blockchain-only method face
an additional hurdle: to affect the outcome, they must mine
valid blocks.
8 LIMITATIONS
There are several limitations to our approach and contribu-
tions. As discussed in Section 7.5, Bitcoin and Ethereum are
open blockchains that allow miners to join or leave at any
time [35]. We are unable to account for latecomers that were
previously silent during the pre-window or new to mining
starting at the post-window.
Real attackers may employ strategies that are more com-
plex than we considered. For example, mining pools may
hide their hash rates by switching their mining resources
between networks with the same proof of work algorithm,
such as between Bitcoin and Litecoin (Ethereum’s POW al-
gorithm is designed to advantage GPUs rather than ASICs).
We note therefore, that a conservative merchant may elect
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to sum the hash rates across a series of blockchains. (Fortu-
nately, our approach is not subject to the Sybil attack [14], as
we do not separate out mining pool workloads.) But in gen-
eral, externalities that we cannot observe or quantify may
drive attacker strategy and behavior. None of our analysis
considers the economic profitability of attacker strategy.
We have not studied the optimal duration of the pre-
window in Section 7. A longer window assumes steady hash
rates over long periods of time, while missing finer-grained
fluctuations. A short window accounts for recent history
while missing long-term trends. Additionally, in the same
section, we do not offer a specific threshold for bootstrap or
Chernoff bounds. On the other hand, this may be considered
a parameter set by the merchant, who may tune the tradeoff
between security and delay to their preference.
Finally, we offer no direct incentive for miners to issue
status reports. However, doing so may encourage greater
trust and use of blockchains, which benefits miners.
9 RELATEDWORK
There have been many informal proposals to determine the
amount of hash power that went into unconfirmed transac-
tions — see [6] for a list. To the best of our knowledge, no
algorithms have been formally defined, evaluated, or imple-
mented; these suggestions are so preliminary that we cannot
compare our approach. Further, none suggest a method that
uses only existing blockchain information. (A preliminary
version of this paper appeared as a tech report [28].)
The security of a 6-block wait for transaction confirma-
tion has been studied by Rosenfeld [29] and discussed by
Bonneau [8]; see also [7]. Many papers have examined the
double-spend attack in a variety of contexts. Sompolinsky
introduced the GHOST protocol [32], now incorporated in
Ethereum. They showed that double-spend attacks become
more effective as either the block size or block creation rate
increase (when GHOST is not used). Sapirshtein et al. [30]
first observed that some double-spend attacks can be car-
ried out essentially cost-free in the presence of a concurrent
selfish mining [19] attack. More recent work extends the
scope of double-spends that can benefit from selfish mining
to cases where the attacker is capable of pre-mining blocks
on a secret branch at little or no opportunity cost [33] and
possibly also under a concurrent eclipse attack [22].
Several past work have relied on stability in the block-
chain as a requirement for a higher-level service. For exam-
ple, sidechains[4] employ a confirmation period, which is
“a duration for which a coin must be locked on the parent
chain before it can be transferred to the sidechain,” stating
that “a typical confirmation period would be on the order of
a day or two” but not reasoning why. Our technique offers a
quantitative approach to selecting the confirmation period.
Lightning networks [1, 24] and fair-exchange protocols [5]
similarly assume that an initial commitment or refund trans-
action is not revokable (via a double-spend attack), and our
approach would quantify that risk.
10 CONCLUSION
We designed and evaluated two methods to accurately esti-
mate network hash rates to quantify the probabilistic con-
sensus of blockchain systems. Our first method is based on
short status reports issued by miners, while the second uses
only blocks that are published to the blockchain. The latter
approach is less accurate than status reports because there is
less information available per window of time. To evaluate
the accuracy of both methods, we derived bounds on our
estimates and presented simulations using a synthetic block-
chain as ground truth. We also showed that these methods
can be used together in an incremental deployment strategy.
We also implemented our blockchain-only estimator to
show the historical network-wide hash rate of Ethereum
and Bitcoin. Finally, we provided a framework to estimate
consensus on blocks and transactions, using our estimates.
On Bitcoin and Ethereum, we analyzed the depth required
before an attacker’s success is estimated to be 0.001 or less.
We emphasized the importance of status reports by demon-
strating, using synthetic blockchain data, that this depth is
significantly reduced.
A STATUS REPORT CHERNOFF BOUNDS
We derive a bound on the relative deviation of βˆ from β .
Upper tail bound. Let R =
∑n
i=1Vi with Vi ∼ Expon(β).
Jansen [25] shows that for any λ ≤ 1,
P(R ≤ λE[R]) ≤ exp
[
− 1
β
E[R](λ − 1 − ln(λ))
]
. (21)
In our case, E[R] = nβ and R = nβˆ , where βˆ is the observed
sample mean of the status reports. Let λ = 1/(1 + π ). It
follows that
P
(
β − βˆ/βˆ ≥ π
)
= P(nβˆ ≤ λnβ)
≤ exp
[
− 1
β
nβ(λ − 1 − ln(λ))
]
= exp
[ nπ
1 + π − n ln(1 + π )
]
. (22)
Lower tail bound. Jansen [25] shows that for any λ ≥ 1,
P(R ≥ λE[R]) ≤ λ−1exp
[
− 1
β
E[R](λ − 1 − ln(λ))
]
(23)
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If λ = 1 + π , then we have
P
(
βˆ − β/β ≥ π
)
= P(nβˆ ≥ λnβ)
≤ λ−1exp
[
− 1
β
nβ(λ − 1 − ln(λ))
]
=
1
1 + π exp [−n(π − ln(1 + π ))] . (24)
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